Tackling risk by changing behaviour Jenny Firth-Cozens
The need to ensure quality in its widest sense and, within this, to avoid risk or to manage the consequences of risk means that staff must be able to change or maintain their behaviour to produce safe procedures and good outcomes. This inevitably entails perceiving potential risks, devising and following systems which eliminate or minimise these risks, and devising approaches which reduce the effects of accidents when they do occur.
How people's behaviour may be changed towards these goals depends to some extent on the types of changes that are required. At their most general these will be the same for risk management as those in any other sphere of organisational life. In his book on chaos theory and its use within organisations Stacey categorised change according to how easy it is to predict its cause and effects.' This can be usefully applied to the risks involved, resulting in three categories, as follows.
Risks with a clearly recognised antecedent, process, and outcome Such risks would apply, for example, in pathology laboratories, where a specimen is received, is analysed in response to specific requests, and the results are communicated to the person making the requests. In such cases, the actions required can be quite rigorously defined. The current emphasis of getting well supported research findings into clinical practice2 -for example, the use of steroids in preterm births -comes within this riskreducing category of behaviours. In this area (which Stacey calls "closed change" 1) the consequences of any failures are known or fairly easy to predict, and the behaviours that need to be encouraged in staff are therefore those that ideally would become habitualprocedures specified in nursing standards or in protocols, for example. anaesthesia, and so on. Alongside this a contained system will need to be able to respond to the purely clinical but not always controllable aspects of the disease, the equipment, the patient, and the staff.
Risks associated with open ended change beyond control of the organisation These types of risk cannot readily be predicted, and so the process for addressing them and the consequences of them cannot be planned with any accuracy. However, many of the latent factors which will turn risks into accidents or even disasters are already in place within an organisation.' Within the health service as a whole the rise of baby snatchers, the actions of healthcare workers deliberately harming patients, as in the case of Beverly Allit, the technical innovation of minimal access surgery, and the murder of Ben Zito by a psychiatric patient in the community, represent unforeseen and open ended change, whose consequences will unfold for years to come. Major trauma incidents happening locally involve this need for open ended behavioural change as well as some background anticipation and planning of the type that is entailed in contained change, as discussed above.
This paper focuses on the ways of changing behaviour within these different categories. what the sanctions are and in being unidirectional so that the reporting of bad news has no vehicle to transport it * Educating only for certainty rather than for making good decisions * Adaptation to signals or having them in place where they will happen too rarely for learning to be maintained * Failing to ensure that opinion leaders are "replaced" if they leave * Dependency within teams * Risky shifts * Group loyalty above organizational loyalty However, quite commonly the organizational culture stops this arrangement working well. A split function like this may cause all the responsibility or anxiety to be located in the risk manager and all the danger or excitement in the general management and medical staff, for whom taking risks is seen as heroic and macho and avoiding them is "soft."
This splitting of perception is a "social defence" against the anxiety created in any high risk environment. Hirschhorn, using a psychodynamic approach to the workplace, described what is happening: "After exploring the relationship between the safety workers on the one hand and the line workers and managers on the other, I concluded that the latter controlled their anxiety by "blaming the messenger," the safety inspectors, for the bad news, rather than paying attention to their findings. Instead of identifying closely with the inspectors' work and seeing safety issues from their point of view, workers and managers scapegoated the inspector."'' He was referring to a situation in a nuclear power plant! Good leadereship will include being able to see such splits occurring and to rectify them by spreading responsibility for risk more widely as part of a general quality system. Hirschhorn's recommendations for dealing with safety, far from giving responsibility to one group or one individual, involve bringing together the entire organisation to work together on safety issues.5 However, an alternative, which overcomes the difficulty in doing two high demand tasks at once, is to hand one member of a clinical team the task of observing for risk rather than participating, a role that must revolve around the entire team if the dynamic described above is not to occur.
INDIVIDUALS AT RISK Individual differences will also play their part in making people more or less susceptible to particular risks. Some can be changed, others simply need to be recognized so that they can be compensated for as far as possible. Personality differences (which have been discussed more fully elsewhere'2'2) may need to be appreciated and used creatively rather than shunned. For 
Conclusions
In implementing change to reduce risk it is important, firstly, to consider the type of change required and then to use several methods in order to take into account the differences that exist within and between organisations.
In terms of closed or contained change what needs to be learnt (perhaps from a research finding, or by team consensus, or from risk analysis) must be accurately and clearly specified and appropriate training to the staff involved. Where possible they can be taught appropriate responses to risk signals, strengthening these by discovering and delivering appropriate rewards to increase the desired behaviour. In addition, we can address the politics of change by getting the support of influential and respected leaders to take the issues forward and help to maintain the behaviours, remembering however that the flag they carry needs to be handed on rather than simply stuck in the corner of the storeroom.
At the same time, change of the contained or open ended type requires that individual staff be encouraged towards flexibility and questioning. There is no reason why people cannot learn to behave in both ways, though some will be better at one rather than the other, and these differences should be used to advantage.
More fundamental than these strategies, however, is the need for individuals and teams to experience belonging first and foremost to the organisation rather than feeling and using barriers: them and us, managers and clinicians, doctors and nurses, splits which will lie as dynamite for future sparks. While there are such divisions responsibility and blame can be shifted elsewhere and so any organisational structure put in place for risk must ensure that such splits, if present, are not built into its foundations.
